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Abstract
The Revolution of 1911 leading to the collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty started with the Railway Project Crisis 
(1911, May) in Sichuan Province, the studies of which 
have focused on the political and economic game of 
railway project and reserved capital between both factions, 
i.e. constitutionalist and revolutionaries, and the Qing 
Government, but there are a few of researches from the 
financial point of view, especially, from the perspective 
of national financial credit as the starting point. In the 
final analysis, the game interaction between national 
capital and private capital aims to control the railway 
monopoly resources. The awakening of national self-
awareness of rights, the struggle of local-central power 
and profits segmentation as well as the magnification 
of the consciousness of ethnic group all were connected 
through the new thing of railway finance. The join force 
from each faction was formed under the private capital 
financing, with the slogan of breaking the agreements 
and railway project protection, the vested interest 
groups were attacked under the shelter of state-owned 
capital. Because of the private capital financing network 
represented by the stock by rent extraction, the struggle 
was abnormally fierce and tough. Construction of railway 
via foreign debts, in fact, originated from Zhang Zhidong, 
who referred to the German and Japanese experiences of 
construction of railway via foreign debts, with the purpose 
of retaining our sovereignty. That can be seen from his 
repetition in his memorial. Sheng Xuanhuai, a trader 
directly inheriting the cause, knew the nature and rights 
of private capital unclearly. Especially, he nationalized 
the special financial capital, i.e. Sichuan people’s stock 
by rent extraction in the simple and crude way, and lacked 
of in-depth understanding and macroscopic view. Even 
so, from the perspective of actual long-term rights and 
interests of the shareholders, the railway state-owned 
policy by the Qing Government is similar to the policy of 
original merchant-operated railway. The problem is that 
at this point, the Qing Government lost credit because 
of fake constitutionalism in politics and Zhaoxin stock 
bankruptcy in economics, but applied the foreign railway 
financial form mechanically to the Chengdu-Hankou 
railway with loss of political and economic credit. In 
the face of the private financial groups in the tight-knit 
network as well as the fierce and persistent struggle, it 
is no wonder that the Qing Government had “ineffable 
surprise”. The historical event enlightened that: the form 
of railway finance is not confined to the state-owned or 
private-owned or government-merchant joint management 
forms, the key is that the government providing the state-
owned capital should have enough credit in politics and 
economics, fully consider the benefits of private capital, 
and give necessary attention and response to reasonable 
political demands. In this sense, undoubtedly, the credit is 
the first importance for railway finance with long earning 
cycle.
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1.  BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN OF 
CHENGDU-HANKOU RAILWAY 
After Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the foreign 
powers competed for “spheres of influence” in China, 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Railway Finance and National Credit: A Study of 
Chengdu-Hankou Railway Protect Crisis as a Center
170
plundering the sovereignty of Chinese railway. In the 
eyes of the foreign powers, Sichuan Province is abundant 
in natural resources and populous, and is a wide place 
where they dumped the goods and exported the capital. 
At that time, the foreign powers were eager to open the 
railway channels entering into Sichuan Province from two 
directions. The first direction is from the south of Burma 
and Vietnam via Yunnan Province to Sichuan Province. 
After taking the building rights of Yunnan-Burma railway 
and Yunnan-Vietnam railway respectively, Britain and 
France attempted in vain to extend the railway to Chengdu 
and Chongqing of Sichuan Province, and then connected 
it to the railways in the Yangtze River Basin. The second 
direction is from the southeast coast area of China to the 
Central China, and then to build the railway from Hankou 
to Sichuan Province. This was the reason why the foreign 
powers vainly attempted to build Chengdu-Hankou 
railway in haste. “On China’s economic and political 
infiltration, the struggle between foreign powers is firstly 
embodied in the aids to their own industrial enterprises 
(for example, the suppliers of railroad tracks, locomotive 
or carriages) by the governments of the western countries. 
Secondly, since 1890, the financial factor began to occupy 
the leading position, and the capital output belonging to 
the imperialist essential characteristics can invest huge 
capital in the railway, to generate considerable benefits. 
The fierce competition between multinational banks and 
financial groups involves that their governments in the 
investment, leading to the formation of financial unions, 
but these financial unions do not always coincide with 
the political unions” (Marchisio, 2009, p.6). “Since 1902, 
the understanding of each country in the Chinese railway 
issue was subject to the world political struggle. We can 
see the reconciliation between France and Britain, as well 
as the confrontation between Britain and Germany, Russia 
and Japan. After realizing that the diplomatic feud makes 
their works paralyze in China, the industrialists finally 
constituted an international financial syndicate from 1908 
to 1911 though overcoming all kinds of difficulties, to 
control the financial, industrial and railway construction 
in China (Marchisio, 2009, p.7).
Under the domestic strife and foreign aggression, the 
Qing Government announced that the construction of 
railroads was the “self-improvement policy”, took the 
whole situation into account and plan accordingly, and 
“implemented the policy in sequence” in the 24th year 
of Guangxu Emperor’s reign (1898). After the Boxers 
Movement, the Qing Government announced starting a 
thorough reform, implemented the “New Policy”. Under 
the pressure of people voice asking for self-preservation 
of economic rights and self-built railway, the Qing 
Government decided to open the railway right to the private 
capital. It was under this situation that Xi Liang, New 
Governor of Sichuan Province, put forward a proposal on 
building Chengdu-Hankou railway by ourselves.
In June 1903, Xi Liang was transferred from Rehe 
Commander to Governor of Sichuan. According to the 
agreement reached by Xi Liang and Zhang Zhidong, 
Governor of Hunan and Hubei, in Beijing, the petition 
dated of July 8 was that “the Chengdu-Hankou railway 
company will be constructed by us, to utilize the 
economic source and retain our sovereignty” (Posthumous 
Manuscript of Xi Liang of No. 3 Institute of History of 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1959, p.455). Guangxu 
Emperor asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
discussion on it, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
presented a memorial to Guangxu Emperor for agreement. 
In September of the same year, Xi Liang arrived at 
Chengdu, after preparation, the government-run Chengdu-
Hankou Railway Head Office was founded in Chengdu 
in January 1904, namely, in December of the29th year 
of Guangxu Emperor’s reign. Xi Liang proposed in his 
memorials of establishment of Chengdu-Hankou Railway 
Corporation, “the state establishes the company, offers 
shares to the Chinese people, and preserves the economic 
rights by ourselves.” and the principle of “do not offer 
shares to foreign countries, and do not contract foreign 
loans” (Posthumous Manuscript of Xi Liang of No. 3 
Institute of History of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1959, 
p.455). Xi Liang’s suggestion received the thumbs-up and 
approval from the Qing Government, this principle resisted 
foreign aggression but cannot resolve the conflict between 
officials and civilian. Because “the Sichuan section of 
Chengdu-Hankou Railway was arduous and long. As 
estimated at that time, it cost at least fourteen million 
liang silver. The capital of independent state and salt taxes 
were collected and paid individually, and each proceeds 
had a special purpose. As the statistics showed, the annual 
revenue of Sichuan Province was sixteen million or 
seventeen million liang silver, how to raise such a huge 
capital?” (Posthumous Manuscript of Xi Liang of No. 3 
Institute of History of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1959, 
p.455). When raising railway funds, “after investigation of 
raising railway funds, there are two ways, namely, stocks 
for subscription and stocks by rent extraction. Both of them 
must be transacted separately, and can be implemented in 
parallel” (Marchisio, 2009, p.7). “All households having 
their own properties and lands, no matter by what kind of 
way, such as ancestral heritage, self-purchase, donating, 
self-cultivating, renting land and collecting rents, more 
than 10 dan of grains, were taxed by 3% of actual annual 
revenue. If the households collect the rent of 100 dan of 
grains, they were taxed 3 dan of grains. It is calculated in 
such sequence, regardless of public property or temple 
land. If the households collect the rent of less than 10 dan 
of grains, they were not taxed” (Marchisio, 2009, p.7).
Two principles of building the Sichuan railway 
proposed by Xi Liang are the “self-management” and 
“government-run”. “Self-management” means the Chinese 
people independently construct the railway; “government-
run” means the railway company is manipulated by the 
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government. As Article 24 of Chapter Three “Stock by 
Rent Extraction” in Articles of Association of Chengdu-
Hankou Railway Head Office for Flotation states, 
“everyone involved in stocks by rent extraction shall 
comply with Article 16 of Articles of Association, but 
cannot intervene in the railway rights of our company 
because of stocks of rent extraction” (Dai, 1959, pp.9-10).
As a result, the government-run Chengdu-Hankou 
Railway Head Office operated completely according to 
the regulations in the official circles, and the Sichuan 
people had no right to enquire the corporation business. 
The president of the railway company was appointed by 
the governor and acted by the officials from the lower 
departement, and most of clerks were also the candidates 
for officials, but the Sichuan people paying the share 
capital had no right to enquire the corporation business. 
Until October 1904, the Chengdu-Hankou Railway 
Corporation was in the state that the capital cannot be 
raised completely for a long time, and the project cannot 
commence for a long time. “The Chengdu-Hankou 
Railway Corporation was founded norminally”. “The 
company has its name but no capital, existing in name 
only” (Dai, 1959, pp.9-10). In July 1905, because of lots 
of malpractices in the process of raising capital, the public 
opinion was in a very disturbed state. Under the request 
of all parties, Xi Liang changed the nature of the company 
to the “official-merchant joint management”, so as to 
reconcile the conflicts between officials and merchants, 
and respectively appointed an official and a merchant 
as Executive Officer. The Sichuan Railway Corporation 
was changed into a company jointly managed by officials 
and merchants in the name, but the real power was in 
the hands of the officials, so the changed company was 
same as the previous company. As Article 16 of Articles 
of Association of Chengdu-Hankou Railway Head Office 
for Flotation states, “Any shareholder who has his own 
view might as well present it item by item, waiting for 
choice. However, he shall intervene in the administrative 
power; for fear that the president has no idea or plan of 
his own and accomplishes nothing, the real power passes 
into others’ hands, and other disadvantages” (Dai, 1994, 
pp.270-271). “For all the corporation laws of the Qing 
Government, the shareholders shall enjoy their rights, but 
the Sichuan people have no right to enquire” (Dai, 1994, 
p.1884).  Xi Liang gave a lame excuse for it, naturally, the 
practice unchanged in fact was opposed by the Sichuan 
gentlemen and common people. So more and more 
Sichuan gentlemen and common people urged for the 
merchant-operated railway. In 1906, Pu Dianjun gathered 
more than three hundred Sichuan students studying in 
Japan, such as Hu Jun and Xiao Xiang, to establish the 
Improvement Association of Chengdu-Hankou Railway 
in Japan. Pu Dianjun was elected as President. He jointly 
signed a petition with its main members to Xi Liang, 
requesting that Sichuan Railway Corporation should be 
completely operated by the merchants.
The Sichuan gentlemen and common people repeatedly 
protested and the movement of recovery of economic 
rights was hold nationwide, Sichuan Governor Xi Liang 
had to report on March 4, 1907: the Sichuan Railway 
Corporation was changed into the merchant-operated 
Chengdu-Hankou Railway Co., Ltd. in accordance with 
the Business Law, “the original executive officer was 
dissolved” (Posthumous Manuscript of Xi Liang of No. 3 
Institute of History of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1959, 
p. 653). Qiao Shu’nan was elected as General Manger, and 
Hu Jun as Vice-general Manger. According to the articles 
of association of the railway companies in Zhejiang 
Province, etc., 59 articles were renewed in the articles of 
association. On the eve of being transferred as Yunnan-
Guizhou Governor, Xi Liang presented a memorial to the 
Qing Government that the Sichuan Railway Corporation 
was changed into a company operated by the merchants, 
and threw the focus of the officials-merchant conflict, 
namely, the leadership of the Chengdu-Hankou Railway 
Corporation, to the successor and the Qing Government 
in the policy dilemma. Successfully striving for of the 
merchant-operated corporation, on the one hand, reflects 
the strength of the emerging bourgeoisie as the core of the 
private capital group; since then, on the other hand, the 
contradiction between the decadent and declining political 
superstructure and the economic base became increasingly 
prominent.
2.  FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE 
ORIGIN OF THE RAILWAY PROJECT 
CRISIS
As recorded in the Pandects of Received Amount Concise 
Table released by the Sichuan Railway Corporation 
in the 3rd year of Xuantong Emperor (1911), from the 
establishment of the company to the 2nd year of Xuantong 
Emperor, the total stock capital raised for 6 years were 
11,983,005 liang silver, among which the stocks by rent 
extraction reached 9,288,128 liang silver, accounting 
for more than 77.5%, equivalent to 2.3 times of the total 
amount of land tax (diding yin) in Sichuan Province 
(Kui, et al., 1985, pp.444-445). Although Xi Liang had 
repeatedly claimed that “if the households collect the 
rent of less than 10 dans of grains, they were not taxed; 
thus the poor people had no pain” (Lu, 1984, p.548), 
but actually, the civilians were still tired. In the rent 
extraction, each prefecture and county often reduced the 
threshold; in some places, the threshold even was reduced 
to two qian, three qians or one fen and two fens (Lu, 
1984, p.500). In this way, all landlords shall pay the land 
tax in the urban and rural, even the land-holding peasant 
or half-land-holding peasant and tenant peasant cannot 
escape. The center of railway stock by rent extraction was 
lowered, so that the Chengdu-Hankou railway finance 
was quite different from Guangzhou-Hankou railway and 
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Beijing-Hankou railway, this is also the important reason 
why the struggle of the latter was not intense as that of 
Chengdu-Hankou railway in the process of recovery of 
state-owned railway.
The collection of stock by rent extraction started from 
the orderly control, and gradually became an excessive 
plunder. The lowest-class people who can escape the 
payment in the initial system design were involved in 
the Chengdu-Hankou Railway Corporation, which was 
the largest modern capitalism enterprise established in 
Sichuan. The establishment of the company not only 
cultivated the Sichuan people with the basic financial 
knowledge, but also united the power of the Sichuan 
people because of financial cohesion, bursting out a great 
and tough power.
However, the stock by rent extraction disturbed the 
public very much, why the public was not satisfied when 
Qing Government exempted the stock by rent extraction 
in implementing the nationalization of railway? It should 
be understood from the trigger for the Railway Project 
Crisis, “telegraph”. There was such statement in the 
telegraph released by Sheng Xuanhuai and Duan Fang to 
inform Wang Renwen of handling the stock capital of the 
Chengdu-Hankou railway, “If the stock capital needs to 
be repaid by the department, the department must contract 
foreign loans, following by Hunan and Hubei Provinces, 
and the capital shall be paid back by the finance of 
Sichuan Province” (Dai, 1994, p.585).  It can be seen 
that the exemption of stock by rent extraction rent comes 
with a price, the price is to contract foreign loans, and 
foreign debts should be repaid by the finance of Sichuan 
Province. In fact, that is the revision of Zhang Zhidong’s 
policy of contracting foreign loans. Sheng Xuanhuai’s 
representative in the advisory council made an excuse, 
what was called was, “Lu Mengxiong, special agent, said 
again: raising a loan started with Zhang Wenxiang, now, 
our department only continued to that policy! Li Wenxi, 
senator, said: it was stipulated by Zhang Wenxiang, and 
was in a draft contract. In addition, it was not signed for a 
long time, why it cannot be delayed this year? Besides, the 
draft contract only stipulated for the Guangzhou-Hankou 
railway, not the Chengdu-Hankou railway. Lu Mengxiong, 
special agent, said, this was a legal issue, but became just 
the modification of the draft contract in our department by 
mail” (Dai, 1994, p.1673). 
Zhang Zhidong consistently advocated the political 
view of contracting foreign loans, “the governor has no 
idea or plan of his own and accomplishes nothing, time 
flies... in November of the last year, I had stipulated the 
loan in the articles of association well; thus the railway 
right would not be lost, without any disadvantages. It was 
hereby stated” (Dai, 1994, p.470). 
“I checked and ratified these provisions item by 
item, and argued that the loan and the construction of 
railway are two different things. There was no loss for 
China’s economic rights and sovereignty. There was a 
small amount of discount, which was unprecedented in 
Chinese history of loan” (Dai, 1994, p.471). When the 
Qing Government designed the railway financial policy; 
basically, it originated from Zhang Zhidong, and inherited 
by Sheng Xuanhuai, and a consistent tone is not to lose 
the sovereignty. However, the foreign debts were required 
to be repaid by the finance, undoubtedly, which would 
touch the Sichuan people’s concern about the existing 
capital of the railway company. There were two handling 
methods for the railway stock capital mostly concerned by 
the Sichuan people stipulated in the “telegraph”:
A.  The corporate  s tocks were al lowed to  be 
changed into national railway stocks regardless of 
civilian shareholder, merchant shareholder and official 
shareholder, with 6 ‰ guaranteed interests. The returning 
term must be prescribed for the stocks. It was allowed to 
share out the margin of profit, to mortgage them in Da 
Qing Bank and Bank of Communications.
B. If the shareholders were willing to change the 
corporate stocks into the national guaranteed stocks, the 
waste capital of the company over the years, in addition to 
bad debts, needs not to be converted into the capital stock. 
If there were a margin of profit in the future, they would 
be covered respectively, showing the solicitude (Dai, 
1994, p.471). 
The shareholders of the Chengdu-Hankou railway 
may not reduce their profits, but the actual burden 
of the railway in a large proportion of stock by rent 
extraction was reduced. From the perspective of real 
earnings, there is a little difference between the merchant-
operated company and the state-owned company for 
the shareholders, which is also the reason why the Qing 
Government had “ineffable surprise” in the face of the 
Railway Project Crisis. In other words, the nationalizing 
policy of the Qing Government used the experiences 
of Germany and Japan, having its rationality from the 
technical level. The advocates for the merchant-operated 
railway realized that, to a certain extent, whether the 
railway should be operated by the state or by the merchant 
was not a legal issue, but an economic policy.
“Different countries have different policies of railway, 
so their systems are different. Nowadays, there are four 
types of practices: the merchants own and manage the 
industries; the merchants own the industries which are 
managed by the government ; the state own the industries 
which are managed by the merchants; the state own and 
manage the industries” (Dai, 1994, p.167). The form of 
railway finance is not confined to the state-owned or 
private-owned or government-merchant joint management 
forms, the key is that the government providing the state-
owned capital should have enough credit in politics and 
economics, fully consider the benefits of private capital, 
and give necessary attention and response to reasonable 
political demands.
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3.   RAILWAY FINANCE FROM THE 
VISION OF NATIONAL CREDIT
Zhao Erfeng argued in the telegraph dated of July 
5th of the 3rd year of Xuantong Emperor’s reign, “at 
the beginning, the Sichuan people complied with the 
imperial edict ‘the railway is nationalized, and whether to 
conditionally subscribe relevant stocks is at the disposal 
of the Sichuan people’, there was no objection. When 
the loan contract was concerned, there were disputes 
about the railway and contract. Everyone thought that the 
contract was based on Zhang Wenxiang’s draft contract, 
but the original one was not applicable in Sichuan. At 
present, Yikui was replaced by Jinghan, so people were 
not reconciled. Furthermore, Sichuan Province used its 
own capital to build the railways in other provinces, for 
consideration of the public benefit. Without the resolution 
of the shareholders, the stocks were taken back, violating 
the initial intention of the Sichuan people, and deviating 
from the imperial edict “whether to conditionally 
subscribe relevant stocks is at the disposal of the Sichuan 
people”. Especially, the common people were retained by 
the provisions in the contract, with the loss of sovereignty, 
same as other countries owning the railway in China, 
which would bring a great misfortune to China. Therefore, 
in the merchants’ strike and students’ strike, the Sichuan 
people were so determined. “If the Qing Government 
showed solicitude for the Sichuan people, the Sichuan 
railway was temporarily operated by the merchants, and 
the bill of loan and construction of railway was presented 
to the advisory council for resolution. If the bill did not 
pass, there would be no different opinion”.1 The situation 
described in the telegraph shows us the consequences 
that the Qing Government broke its double promises to 
the Sichuan people in politics and economy. As for the 
railway problem, the performance by the governors, 
shareholders and other interest groups showed that there 
was a deep political confrontation between the central 
government and local authorities. The Railway Protection 
Comrades combined the economic purpose with the 
political purpose, which can be proven from the slogans 
“the railway should be operated by the merchants” and “all 
government affairs should be revealed for public opinion”. 
These slogans originated from the imperial edict of 1898 
Political Reform by Guangxu Emperor, revealing that the 
Railway Protection Comrades had the reforming tendency 
of Guangxu Emperor. They did not want to overthrow 
the Qing Dynasty, but seek for the new systems, i.e. 
the distribution of political powers and the system of 
representation.
1 Literature Library of Palace Museum, Collection of Documents, 
23th series, Sichuan Railway Cases in the 1st year of Xuantong 
Emperor’s reign of Qing Dynasty, pp.1-2. the edition of the Palace 
Museum in 1930, quoted from Lu Zijian: Sichuan Financial 
Historical Materials in the Qing Dynasty (Edition 1 in June 1984), 
Publishing House of Sichuan Academy of Social Science, p.498.
The Chengdu-Hankou Railway Project Crisis occurred 
under the national political background of the movement 
of parliament petition launched by the constitutionalists, 
and reached its climax at the end of the 2nd year of 
Xuantong Emperor’s reign. In September 23 of the same 
year, 18 governors, grand coordinators, generals and 
commanders, led by Xi Liang, Governor General of three 
northeast provinces of China, jointly presented a memorial 
to the emperor, demanding “the central government 
should immediately organize the cabinet, and an imperial 
edict is hereby issued that the parliament will be founded 
next year”. The Qing Government launched the cabinet 
composed of 13 people under pressure, including only 
4 Han officials, i.e. Xu Shichang, Tang Jingchong, 
Sheng Xuanhuai and Liang Duiyan, 9 Manchu, i.e. Yi 
Kuang, San Qi, Zai Ze, Zai Xun, Pu Lun belonging to 
the hereditary title of nobility in the imperial clan, Shao 
Chang belong to House of Aisin Gioro and Shou Qi 
belong to the imperial clan. Among them, the Manchu 
nobiliti accounts for the majority in the cabinet, including 
the royal family occupying the majority, so the cabinet 
was called “the royal cabinet”.
The royal cabinet came into being, showing the truth 
that Qing Government’s fake constitutionalism and 
real centralization were edging into the light. After the 
imperial edict was issued, the public opinion was seething 
with indignation. On May 14 of the 3rd year of Xuantong 
Emperor’s reign, the representatives who hurried to the 
second federation of the Provincial Assembly in Beijing 
presented a memorial to the Censorate, proposing that the 
royal cabinet was incompatible with the constitutional 
monarchy, warning that if the Qing Government supported 
the royal cabinet, the public would doubt that the central 
government had the intention to fundamentally eliminate 
the constitutional decree”, “the fundamental principles to 
administer a country was shaken, then a dramatic change 
would be latent”.2 What was exchanged after the advice 
in earnest was the rebuke in stern words and the rebuff 
by the Qing Government, the constitutionalists were 
disappointed and upset, and published a Declaration to 
the Chinese People, showing “the hope was dead” after 
the imperial edict was issued. The Qing Government was 
really stubborn, and completely lost the confidence of 
the people, so the revolution would not be avoided, the 
constitutionalists began to seek for another way out (Xu & 
Dong, 1993, p.486).
Accompanied with the loss of political credibility, the 
economic credit of the Qing Government was completely 
lost. The breach of faith started with Zhaoxin stock 
implemented by the Ministry of Revenue in February of 
the 24th year of Guangxu Emperor’s reign. The content 
and nature of Zhaoxin stock were similar to those of the 
Chengdu-Hankou railway finance, namely, the stocks 
2 Eastern Miscellany, in May 1872, the 8th year of Guangxu 
Emperor’s reign, No.6, Chronicle of Events in China.
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belong to the national debt finance supported by the state 
power, with a predetermined rate of return. “the Ministry 
of Revenue issued Zhaoxin stock, compiled its serial 
number and word size, 500,000 pieces of stock certificates 
per value of 100 liang silver, amounting to 50,000,000 
liang silver; 20,000 pieces of stock certificates per value 
of 1,000 liang silver, amounting to 20,000,000 liang 
silver; in a total of 100,000,000 liang silver. In addition, 
the Zhaoxin Bureau was established in the Ministry of 
Revenue, and the clerks and managers were selected”. 
“The stock capital would be repaid in 20 years, at 5‰ 
of annual interests, without increase in Leap Year. In the 
first 10 years, only debt interests would be repaid but 
not the principal; in the latter 10 years, both interests 
and principal would be repaid, and the interests would 
be reduced accordingly. In each repaying time, officials, 
merchants and civilians can ask for payment after 
presenting the stock for inspection. Since the first year, 
the stock certificate would be cut one square after each 
reimbursement. After 20 years, the interests and principal 
would be repaid completely, namely, the stock certificates 
shall be handed in for cancellation.” “The stock can be 
endorsed for mortgage purchase, which was same as the 
industrial voucher. But the mortgage purchase should be 
put on record in the Zhaoxin Bureau.”3
Because of its similarity, the Qing Government having 
the economic credit bankruptcy caused by the event of 
Zhaoxin stock still cannot receive the fundamental support 
from the Sichuan people, although they thought that the 
nationalization of railway was reasonable and lawful.
“Over the past few years, the Sichuan people regarded 
the Sichuan railway as the lifeblood, and were moderate in 
dieting and clothes, but still purchased the stocks as usual. 
At present, the Chengdu-Hankou railway should be owned 
by the state, the committee was checking the revenue and 
expenditure of the company, and the rental stock bureau 
dealt with the procedures, which cannot be completed for 
a short time. When paying the interests and exchanging 
for the stock certificates, they would often negotiate with 
the Sichuan people. Under the infinite royal graciousness, 
the stock by rent extraction was ceased suddenly, for fear 
that the imperial edict was misunderstood, all the stocks 
purchased before became the donations, just like Zhaoxin 
stock last year, mining stock in adjacent provinces and so 
son” (Dai, 1994, p.611).
“Taking Xuanhan County as an example, in the 24th 
year of Guangxu Emperor’s reign, the Qing Government 
was decayed, and national treasury was exhausted. So 
Qing Government urged the Ministry of Revenue to 
issue 100,000,000 pieces of stocks, for borrowing the 
3 Continuation of Donghua Record, Guangxu, 143, p3-5. quoted from 
Lu Zijian: Sichuan Financial Historical Materials in the Qing Dynasty 
(Edition 1 in June 1984), Publishing House of Sichuan Academy of 
Social Science, p. dynasty, sichuan academy of social sciences press, p. 
437.
private capital in each county, 10 liang silver per share, 
at several milli percent of interests. The principal would 
be repaid in different years, called Zhaoxin, representing 
no deception. The bureau was set up in Wenchang Palace, 
entrusted the gentlemen for supervising and handling. The 
county was the first level to handle those stocks, raising 
the stock capital of 7000 liang silver. Then the stocks 
were assigned to the officials and merchants, amounting 
to 9000 liang silver, and all the stocks were purchased. 
However, the state system was damaged, and the imperial 
edict was ceased. Those who purchased the stocks had 
waited for several years, but having no interests, even 
the principal cannot be repaid. So at that time, there 
was a statement “Zhaoxin cannot be trusted”, that was 
a money-making scam!... since then, though under the 
infinite royal graciousness, spacious and flat roads were 
built, all national politics would be innovated, and the 
constitutionalism was prepared, for implementation, how 
plain and honest the people are! People left and ignored 
them, covering their ears, and answered back sarcastically, 
“giving me means exploiting me, just like Zhaoxin stock.” 
No people believed in and responded to it! The Qing 
Government was trying to cheat us in the territory with the 
population of 400,000,000 people. At the beginning, we 
had doubt, then rebelled against it, ultimately, accelerated 
its death (Lu, 1984, p.447). There were records that 
Zhaoxin Stock had no good faith in Fuzhou, Guang’an 
County, Dazhu County, Jiangjin County, Ba County, 
Zizhou, Santai County, Qianwei County and so on (Lu, 
1984, pp.445-449). 
This matter lasted six or seven years from starting 
to collect the stock capital to Xinhai year. The people’s 
wisdom was gradually developed, and the understanding 
also became popular gradually. In spring of the 3rd year 
of Xuantong Emperor’s reign, the imperial edict was 
delivered by mail, requesting Minster Sheng Xuanhuai to 
make the planning for national railway, considering the 
Chengdu-Hankou railway as the main trunk, which would 
be owned by the state. The Sichuan people were afraid 
that, after the nationalization, previous works and future 
benefits all would be lost. Moreover, they feared that 
their stock capital would serve the Qing Government just 
like Zhaoxin stock. Therefore, the gentleman presented 
a memorial to the governor firstly, and begged him to 
transfer it to the emperor, requesting the emperor revokes 
this command.
CONCLUSIONS
In the face of the complete loss of credit by Qing 
Government in politics and economy, Sheng Xuanhuai 
had to “make bricks without straw”. Under the serious 
situation that the national treasury was exhausted, the 
chip in hand was to only rely on the faith of the Chinese 
people for the Qing Government. It is a paradox of 
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dilemma. In the specific implementation process of 
returning stock capital, in fact, the so-called shortcomings 
of the government-run railway had already existed in the 
merchant-operated period. The consistent fundamental 
key of building railway by loan firstly proposed by Zhang 
Zhidong was to protect the national sovereignty, even the 
successor Sheng Xuanhuai’s policy of building railway 
by foreign debts was revised on the basis of Zhang’s, 
but cannot be viewed as the root cause of the outbreak 
of the Railway Project Crisis. The railway protection 
group established under the combined private capital 
financing was not against the nationalization of railway, 
but against the method in which the Qing Government 
handled the railway stock capital under the background 
of bad credibility. The key to handle the contradictions 
was that both sides had their evaluation of the government 
credibility. The “surprise sense” of Qing Government 
exactly showed that there was a great gap between the 
expectation value of national policy of the Qing Dynasty 
and the national psychological recognition value. Of 
course, the gap was not formed within short time, and 
cannot be eliminated in a short time. In other words, the 
reason for the outbreak of the Railway Project Crisis had 
existed, “for a decade, the previous Qing Government 
talked about the constitutionalism, but the national 
people were in the misery and doubt, which feared more 
and more, but the Qing Government became more and 
more autocratic,... everything were out of control, and 
the movement of railway protection was one of them” 
(Dai, 1994, p.34). “The hardship of a nation is the doubt 
between the central government and common people. 
The central government suspects the common people, and 
then stares at the people; the common people suspect the 
central government, and then betray the government. The 
deeper their doubt becomes, the deeper hiding secret is, 
the deeper the secret is, and the more the truth is ignored. 
Thus the common people do not know the reason for 
the matter approved by the government; the government 
does not know the reason for the matter denied by the 
common people. Both of them are locked in a stalemate, 
and then struggle each other, and the society is in chaos” 
(Dai, 1994, p.34). In this sense, there is no doubt that the 
national credit is the first importance for railway finance 
with long earnings cycle.
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